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I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, "occurrence-based" comprehensive general liability
("CGL") insurance policies promise to indemnify the policyholder for "all
sums" resulting from an occurrence during the policy period. In the context
of pollution cases, however, such policies typically contain a "pollution
* Mr. Goldenberg is an attorney with the law firm of Halsey & Bums, P.A., Miami,
Florida. J.D., The George Washington University; M.S., University of California at Los
Angeles; B.S., Tufts University. The firm practices exclusively in the field of environmental
and land use law.
1. See generally John G. Nevius & Steven J. Dolmanisth, The Pollution-Exclusion
Conspiracy: A Newly Recognized Basisfor Recovery, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1103 (1996).
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exclusion" clause that either limits or precludes coverage.2 Because the
standard CGL policy, and the language of the "pollution exclusion" clause,
have changed over the years, whether coverage is precluded or merely
limited generally depends on the date the policy was issued.3
Many pollution cases are initiated with the discovery of damages (i.e.,
contamination), rather than the awareness of a specific pollution release.
Often, it is difficult to trace the contamination back to a specific incident.
Since the damage from a pollution event may occur over an extended period
of time, covered property damage may continue over the course of numerous
policy periods during which different insurers were on the risk. Because the
terms of the standard "pollution exclusion" have changed over the years, the
date of the relevant release or "occurrence" can be the difference between
full indemnification and no indemnification. 5
With the Supreme Court of Florida's rulings in Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc.
v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp.,6 and Deni Associates of Florida,
Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,7 Florida's insureds
seemingly have little chance of recovering insurance proceeds for
environmental pollution claims. In Dimmitt Chevrolet, the court held that
the phrase "sudden and accidental," found in most pollution exclusion
clauses in insurance policies issued between 1970 and 1985, was
unambiguous. 8 More specifically, the court stated that "[t]he ordinary and
common usage of the term 'sudden' includes a temporal aspect with a sense
of immediacy or abruptness." 9 Five years later, in Deni Associates., the
court held that the "absolute pollution exclusion,"' found in most CGL
policies since 1985, was similarly unambiguous, and bars any recovery for
damages arising from the release of pollutants or contaminants."
Although the pollution exclusion clauses have been given a restrictive
reading under Florida law, no Florida court has defined the scope of
coverage in pollution cases in which some, but not all, of the contamination
2. See id. at 1105-10.
3. Id.
4. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 978 F. Supp. 589 (D.N.J.
1997), rev'd, 177 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1999); Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Highlands Ins. Co. v. Aerovox, 676
N.E.2d 801 (Mass. 1997); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of NY, 523
N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
5. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1995).
6. 636 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1993).
7. 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998).
8. Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 704.
9. Id. The "word sudden means abrupt and unexpected." ld
10. DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1137.
11. Id. at 1141.
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was caused by a covered occurrence. This is a critical issue because when
contamination is discovered, it is often possible to identify several
"occurrences" that may have caused or contributed to the contamination.
Rarely, however, is it easy to distinguish the contamination caused by these
various "occurrences." Some of these releases may be covered under the
insurance policy in effect at the time of the release, and others might not.
This situation may arise in a number of different contexts:
* A covered "sudden and accidental" release that has caused pollution
that is indistinguishable from that caused by other nonsudden or
nonaccidental releases;
0 A covered, pre-1985 "sudden and accidental" release that has caused
pollution that is indivisible from that caused by noncovered, post-1985
releases;
0 A pre-1985 release that begins suddenly and accidentally but
continues for an extended period of time, beyond the policy period;
* Multiple, pre-1985 "sudden and accidental" releases that each
occurred during different policy periods with different insurers;
* A covered pre-1985 "sudden and accidental" release that caused
pollution that is indivisible from noncovered post-1985 releases subject to
an "absolute pollution exclusion;"
0 A covered, pre-1970 release not subject to any pollution exclusion
clause that caused pollution that is indivisible or indistinguishable from
that caused by noncovered post-1970 releases;
* Multiple covered releases, but only one from which recovery is
possible (i.e., other insurers have filed for bankruptcy or the policies
cannot be located); and
* A covered release attributable to the insured coupled with other
releases caused by previous or subsequent operators at the site.
This article will discuss the scope of insurance coverage for pollution
claims when more than one release has caused or contributed to the
contamination but not all such releases are covered by the policies then in
effect. While the factual scenarios listed above are different, the same
1999]
3
Goldenberg: The Scope of Insurance Coverage for Pollution Claims in Florida:
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
general legal principles apply. As discussed below, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court of Florida's rulings in Dimmitt Chevrolet and Deni
Associates, there is still hope for insurers to receive full indemnification for
pollution cleanup costs.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE "POLLUTION EXCLUSION" CLAUSE
Beginning in 1966, the standard CGL policy provided coverage for an
"occurrence," which was defined as "'an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.'"2
This definition expanded the scope of coverage from that of earlier,
"accident-based" policies, by including "continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions" as a coverage-triggering event.1 3 At a time when pollution issues
were receiving increased attention, this change from "accident-based" to
"occurrence-based" policies made it clear that insurers intended the standard
CGL policy to apply to pollution claims.14 A few years later, in the early
1970s, insurance companies began including a "pollution exclusion" in their
policies because the earlier policies, drafted before public attention focused
on large scale pollution events, seemed tailor made to cover most pollution
situations. As one commentator noted:
With the increase in litigation concerning environmentally related
losses, the liability exposure of insurers, and the uncertainty that
courts injected into the policy coverage inquiry, the insurers, in
1970, again changed their policies. The insurers' primary concern
was that the occurrence-based policies, drafted before large scale
industrial pollution attracted wide public attention, seemed tailor-
made to extend coverage to most pollution situations.
Consequently, they tacked onto the occurrence-based policies an
12. See Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 703 (quoting Broadwell Realty Serv. Inc. v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of NY, 528 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)) (emphasis added).
13. See id.
14. Eugene R. Anderson & Maxa Luppi, 1970 Pollution Exclusion Filings: Do Two
Wrongs Make A Right?, 3 ENVTL. CLAIMs J. 195, 196 (1991) (quoting E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The
Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1251 (1986)):
With the lesson of accident-based coverage fresh in their minds, the insurers
used new language to remove only the suddenness barrier and to cover
pollution liability that arose from gradual losses. The standard policy made
it clear that the loss had to be unexpected and unintended from the insured's
standpoint for coverage to apply.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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exclusionary clause that applied specifically to pollution related
claims. 1
This new "pollution exclusion," which appeared in virtually all CGL
policies from roughly 1971 through 1986," typically stated that:
[i]nsurance would not apply ... to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids
or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or
body of water, but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
17
This limited pollution exclusion remained in effect until 1985, when a
new endorsement was added to the CGL form to amend coverage' s as
follows: It is agreed that the exclusion relating to the "discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants
or pollutants,"' 9 is replaced by the following:
(1) '"odily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the
actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of pollutants;
(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
(b) At or from any site or location used by or for [the
named insured] or others for the handling, storage, disposal,
processing or treatment of waste;
(c) Which are at any time transported, handled, stored,
treated, disposed of, or processed as waste by or for the named
insured or any person or organization for whom the named insured
may be legally responsible; or
(d) At or from any site or location in which the named
insured or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or
15. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass,
74 Gao. L.J 1237, 1251 (1986) (citations omitted).
16. See Virginia Properties, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 74 F.3d 1131,1132 (lth Cir. 1996).
17. Id. at 1134 (emphasis in original).
18. William P, Shelly & Richard C. Mason, Application of the Absolute Pollution
Exclusion to Toxic Tort Claims: Will Courts Choose Policy Construction or Deconstruction?,
33 TORT & INs. L.J. 749, 752 (1998).
19. Id. at 752.
1999] 377
5
Goldenberg: The Scope of Insurance Coverage for Pollution Claims in Florida:
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
indirectly on behalf of the named insured are performing
operations;
(i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the site or
location in connection with such operations; or
(ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor, clean
up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize the pollutants.
"Pollutants" means any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled,
reconditioned or reclaimed.
20
In Deni Associates, the Supreme Court of Florida held that this
"absolute pollution exclusion," as well as the undefined terms "irritant" and
"contaminant," were clear and unambiguous. 21  In so holding, the court
rejected the argument that the clause excludes only environmental or
industrial pollution.22
As discussed above, the availability of insurance coverage for pollution
events has gone through four distinct phases over the past thirty-five years.
Prior to 1966, pollution events were generally covered under the standard
CGL policy as long as the release could be categorized as an accident. 
3
From roughly 1966 through 1973, most CGL policies covered most pollution
claims.24  Between 1973 and 1985, pollution events were covered
occurrences only if they were sudden and accidental,2 and since 1985, the
standard CGL policy broadly precludes coverage for releases of pollutants or
contaminants. Accordingly, the discovery of contamination may implicate
several insurance policies with very different provisions regarding coverage
for pollution claims.27
20. Id. at 752-53.
21. DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1138-39.
22. See id. Even before Deni Associates it was clear that the "absolute pollution
exclusion" barred coverage for claims arising out of environmental or industrial pollution. See id.
at 1137.
23. See Holis M. Greenlaw, The CGL Policy and the Pollution Exclusion Clause:
Using the Drafting History to Raise the Interpretation Out of the Quagmire, 23 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 233 (1990).
24. See id.
25. See Virgina Properties, Inc., 74 F.3d at 1134.
26. Shelly & Mason, supra note 18, at 752.
27. See New Castle County v. Continental Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1989),
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Ill. SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL RELEASES AFTER DIMMITr CHEVROLET
In Dimmitt Chevrolet, the insured car dealership-sold used crankcase oil
to an oil recycling company known as Peak Oil. As part of its daily
operations, Peak Oil illegally dumped thousands of gallons of used oil into
unlined pits.29 As expected, Peak Oil routinely spilled large quantities of
used oil onto the ground outside of the pits, and when it rained, runoff from
the pits and spills became contaminated.30 The EPA subsequently named
Dimmitt Chevrolet a potentially responsible party ("PRP") liable under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") for the costs of cleaning up the Peak Oil site.31
In holding that insurance coverage did not exist, the Supreme Court of
Florida construed the meaning of "sudden and accidental" within the
pollution exclusion clause at issue in that case. 3 7 As explained in Dimmitt
Chevrolet, a split in authority existed among the various states as to whether
"sudden and accidental" was ambiguous, with many state supreme courts
construing that phrase to mean "unexpected and unintended" pollution and
others holding that it was limited to "abrupt and unintended" pollution.
33
Siding with the latter interpretation, the court explained that the phrase was
not ambiguous and that "[a]s expressed in the pollution exclusion clause, the
word sudden means abrupt and unexpected."34 Applying the policy language
to the facts in this case, the court held that Dimmitt Chevrolet's claim was
barred because "[t]he pollution took place over a period of many years and
most of it occurred gradually."
35
The nongradual spills of used oil were also excluded from coverage, the
court explained, because they occurred on a regular basis, thereby taking
28. Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 701.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. See generally Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1995).
32. Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 703-05. The exclusion in Dimmitt Chevrolet
excluded coverage for.
BODILY INJURY or PROPERTY DAMAGE arising out of the discharge,
dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids, or gases, waste materials... into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any water course or body of water, but this exclusion does not
apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
accidental ....
Id. at 702.
33. Id. at 703.
34. kL at 704.
35. Id at 705.
1999]
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them outside the scope of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
pollution exclusion:
[T]hese spills and leaks appear to be common place events which
occurred in the course of daily business, and therefore cannot, as a
matter of law, be classified as "sudden and accidental." That is,
these "occasional accidental spills" are recurring events that took
place in the usual course of recycling the oil.
36
In Southern Solvents, Inc. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,3 7 the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether, under Florida law, the phrase "sudden
and accidental" in the 1972-85 CGL pollution exclusion applies to the initial
discharge of pollutants or to the subsequent environmental damage. 3 There,
the insured operated a tetrachloroethylene (perchloroethylene) distribution
facility at which four perchloroethylene releases had occurred.39 While the
district court found that the initial discharges of these four releases were
"sudden and accidental," it also found that the resulting leaching was
continuous after the initial discharge. 40 The district court then held that "[t]o
rule that such continuous pollution is 'sudden and accidental' thwarts the
policy goals behind the exclusion" and granted summary judgment in favor
of the insurers.41 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that:
Our reading of Florida law, specifically Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp., 636 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1993),
leads us to conclude that the District Court erred in this respect.
Under Florida law, the discharge must be sudden and accidental,
not the resulting environmental damage.... Based on the holding
in Dimmitt and the unambiguous terms in the policy issued by
Canal it is clear that it is the actual discharge, not the resulting
damages or contamination, which must be sudden and accidental in
order to fall within the exception to the pollution exclusion
clause.42
While Florida courts have not directly addressed the issue, in recent
years Massachusetts courts have considered whether "damage due to the
release of pollutants on particular occasions would be covered under the
36. Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 705 (emphasis added).
37. 91F.3d 102(11th Cir. 1996).
38. Id. at 105.
39. Id. at 103-04.
40. H at 104.
41. Id.
42. Southern Solvents, Inc., 91 F.3d at 105.
[Vol. 24:373380
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sudden and accidental exception to the pollution exclusion clause if the
insured had also engaged in pollution-generating activities not subject to the
exception over a longer period." 43 While these Massachusetts cases
obviously are not binding on Florida courts, they are instructive because
Massachusetts law is consistent with Florida law in its interpretation of the
"sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion.44
In Nashua Corp. v. First State Insurance Co., 5 the court ruled that,
notwithstanding a company's history of routinely delivering hazardous waste
to a landfill, evidence of a subsequent unexpected and abrupt release of a
significant amount of pollutants into the-environment may be sufficient to
confer insurance coverage despite the pollution exclusion clause.46 The test
focuses on whether the triggering event is common or uncommon. 47
Accordingly, the court found that evidence of a burst tank seal, a fire, and a
subsequent explosion created genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the releases were "sudden and accidental."
4
Subsequently, in Highlands Insurance Co. v. Aerovox, Inc.,49 the court
made it clear that the exception to the pollution exclusion clause may apply
to a "pollution-prone industry." 50  The court explained that the test is
whether the triggering event is "so beyond the pale of reasonable
expectability as to be considered 'accidental."' 51 In applying this standard to
the facts of that case, the court looked to whether a "sudden and accidental"
release led to any damages that were more than de minimis.52 This standard
was later applied in Millipore Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 53 in which
the court held that to survive a motion for summary judgment, the insured
"must present specific evidence creating a genuine issue as to whether the
incidents at the sites were sudden and accidental and caused more than a de
minimis release of pollutants into the environment." 54
While these Massachusetts cases are not binding on Florida courts, they
provide some insight into how a Florida court might view "sudden and
43. Millipore Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 115 F.3d 21, 32 (lst Cir. 1997).
44. See Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass.
1990).
45. 648 N.E.2d 1272 (Mass. 1995).
46. See id. at 1276.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. 676 N.E.2d 801 (Mass. 1997).
50. Id. at 806 n.10 (citing Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d
1423, 1427 (5th Cir. 1991).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 806.
53. 115 F.3d 21 (lst Cir. 1997).
54. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
1999]
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accidental" releases by a "pollution-prone industry." 55  However, not all
courts have acknowledged the potential for "sudden and accidental" releases
to co-exist with intentional or nonsudden releases. These courts have
typically avoided the issue by refusing to "microanalyze" the alleged
releases, instead looking at the insured's operations as a whole. 56 This view
is contrary to Florida law because it amounts to a determination that insureds
in pollution prone5 7 industries can never have covered "sudden and
accidental" releases. Some of these courts have gone so far as to suggest
that a "foreseeable" release for which the insured has taken precautions to
prevent or minimize cannot be "sudden and accidental."5 8 Such a position is
akin to a determination that a car accident cannot be sudden and accidental
because of the presence of brakes, seatbelts, and air bags in the cars.
Moreover, this view disregards the policy language and would effectively
eliminate the exception to the pollution exclusion for companies whose
operations might result in pollution. Thus, it seems likely that Florida courts
would recognize the possibility of covered "sudden and accidental" releases
coexisting with noncovered expected or intended releases. This raises the
question of how much coverage is an insured entitled to when the
contamination was caused by both covered and uncovered releases.
55. Highlands Ins. Co., 676 N.E.2d at 806 n.10.
56. See, e.g., Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing
to "break down [the insured's] long-term waste practices into temporal components in order to
find coverage where the evidence unequivocally demonstrates that the pollution was gradual");
Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 768-69 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating "when
viewed in isolation... all releases would be sudden .... Rather than pursuing such meta-
physical concepts, we choose to recognize the reality of Sea Ray's actions in this case.");
Lumbermens, 938 F.2d at 1430 (noting "it is... the nature of an insured's enterprise and its
historical operations that determine the applicability of the [pollution exclusion]."); Hyde Athletic
Indus. v. Continental Cas. Co., 969 F. Supp. 289, 301 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (noting the futility of
perforning a microanalysis of a continuous pattern of pollution); Snyder General Corp. v. Great
Amer. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (stating "[tihe fact that the insured may
have also experienced isolated spills or minor accidents over the same period of time is
irrelevant."); American States Ins. Co. v. Sacramento Plating, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 964, 970-71
(E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding three distinct events that contributed to contamination caused by
pollution occurring in the regular course of plating operation not covered).
57. See, e.g., Smith, 22 F.3d at 1438; Ray Indus., Inc., 974 F.2d at 768-69;
Lumbermens, 938 F.2d at 1430; Hyde Athletic Indus., 969 F. Supp. at 301; Snyder General
Corp., 928 F. Supp. at 680; American States Ins. Co., 861 F. Supp. at 970-71.
58. See, e.g., Smith, 22 F.3d at 1439; American States, Inc., 861 F. Supp. at 970-71.
[Vol. 24:373
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IV. THE EXTENT OF COVERAGE UNDER FLORIDA LAW ONCE A POLICY HAS
BEEN TRIGGERED
Under Florida law, if contract language is plain and unambiguous, it is
to be given the meaning that it clearly expresses.5 9 On the other hand, when
the language is ambiguous, an insurance contract prepared by an insurance
company shall be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.
In determining whether policy language is ambiguous, the court must view
the terms in the context of the specific policy at issue.
In the standard CGL policy, the insurer agrees to pay "all sums which
the INSURED shall become legally obligated to pay as DAMAGES because
of [personal injury or property damage]" caused by an occurrence during the
policy period and within the policy territory.62 As discussed above, the word
"occurrence" is typically defined as "an accident including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in BODILY INJURY or
PROPERTY DAMAGE neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the INSURED. 6 3 Because the occurrence must take place during the
policy period, and occurrence is defined as an "accident," it would seem that
there must be an accident during the policy period in order to trigger
coverage. However, this no longer seems to be the case in Florida. In State
Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. CTC Development Corp.,64 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that when the term "accident" is undefined in
an insurance policy, the term includes not only "accidental events," but also
damages or injuries that are neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured.65 Because the typical definition of "property
damage ' 966 requires that it occur during the policy period, CTC suggests that
59. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Seaworld of Fla., Inc., 586 So. 2d 95, 97-98 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
60. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986).
61. Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 704.
62. Id. at 702.
63. Id.
64. 720 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1998).
65. d at 1076.
66. Property damage means:
(1) the physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs
during the policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time
resulting therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has not been
physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an
occurrence during the policy period.
BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DIsPUTES
§ 7.03(b) (9th ed. 1998).
1999]
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it is not necessary for an "accidental event" to occur during the policy period
in order to trigger coverage. Coverage is triggered whenever unexpected or
unintentional damage occurs during the policy period, as long as no other
policy exclusion applies. This interpretation is consistent with either the
injury-in-fact or continuous trigger theories discussed in section II.B. below.
A. The Nature of Environmental Liability
Environmental statutes, such as CERCLA, impose strict liability for the
mere release of hazardous substances. 67 Under CERCLA, liability is joint
and several unless a PRP can demonstrate that the damages are divisible.
68
Accordingly, the mere release of a hazardous substance, regardless of the
quantity released, can render a PRP liable for all cleanup costs at the site as
long as the damages were not divisible. Implicit in the judicial opinions
holding CERCLA liability to be joint and several is the recognition that
multiple releases frequently combine to cause indivisible damage.69 In such
cases, Congress placed the burden on PRP's to show that their conduct
caused only a discrete portion of the contamination at the site.
70
When insurance policies are involved, the corollary question is whether
the insured must bear the burden of proving precisely how much of the
contaminant is traceable to a covered "occurrence," or whether the insured
must prove that the damage caused by the covered "occurrence" is divisible
from the rest of the contamination. This article posits that the language of
the standard CGL policy and Florida's concurrent cause doctrine place the
burden of proving divisibility of damages on the insurer.
Under Florida law, CERCLA cleanup costs constitute "damages" as
that term is defined in the standard CGL policy.71 Similarly, a majority of
courts consider environmental contamination that has already occurred to be
"property damage" within the scope of a CGL policy. 72 Thus, once coverage
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1995). The Florida Legislature has also provided for joint
and several liability for pollution-related damages. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 376.313, 403.727(4),
768.81(4)(b) (1999) (making comparative fault inapplicable to actions for recovery of actual
economic damages resulting from pollution).
68. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1993). See
Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 899 (5th Cir. 1993).
69. See Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d at 894-95.
70. Id. at 912.
71. United States v. Peppers Steel & Alloys, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1574, 1582 (S.D. Fla.
1993), affid in part, rev'd in part, 87 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Hudson Ins. Co. v.
Double D Management Co., 768 F. Supp. 1542, 1546 (M.D. Fla. 1991); but see Hayes v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (N.D. Fla. 1988).
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is triggered, the insurer becomes liable for the full cost of cleanup unless it
can show that the damages resulting from the covered occurrence are distinct
or divisible from the rest of the contamination at the site.
B. Trigger of Coverage
Whether such damage was "caused by an occurrence during the policy
period" is often a difficult question because Florida's courts have not
definitively resolved which "trigger of coverage" applies to long tail
environmental releases, i.e., releases that may have gone unnoticed for many
years only to later be identified as the source of contamination at a site.
73
'"rigger of coverage" refers to the circumstances that "trigger" or activate
the insurer's obligation to indemnify the insured.74 While this term is not
found in CGL policies, it is a term of convenience used to describe what
must happen during the policy period in order to create a duty on the part of
the insurer to indemnify the insured.75 As such, it is largely an issue of
timing.
76
The policy language of the insuring clause and the definition of
"occurrence," and the "owned property" exclusion may be combined as
follows:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of... property damage... caused by... an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in
... physical injury to or destruction of tangible property [of an
entity other than the insured] which occurs during the policy
period.77
Because of the insurance industry's repeated use of the word "which"
instead of "that," this language should be read in less restrictive manner.78
Clauses introduced by the word, "that," on the other hand, are restrictive and
essential; removing it materially alters the sentence. 79 Id. Accordingly, the
73. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 890 n. 12 (Cal. 1995).
74. Id. at 880 n.2.
75. See id. at 880-81 n.2.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 881, 889-900 n.21; MORTON S. FREEMAN, THE GRAmMATICAL LAwYER 25
(1979) (clauses introduced by "which" are nonrestrictive and provide only incidental or
nonessential information about a previous word).
78. FREEMAN, supra note 77, at 25; see also HENRY WE]IHo EN, LEGAL WarriNG STYLE
33 (1961).
79. Freeman, supra note 77; Weihofen, supra ntoe 78.
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policy language quoted above can be restated, without changing its meaning,
as follows: "[t]he company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums
... because of... property damage.., caused by an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions.80 This statement is much
more conducive to coverage than insurance companies would like, and while
technical distinctions between "which" and "that" may seem "nitpicky," the
policy language was drafted by the insurance industry." Florida law is clear
that when policy language is ambiguous, an insurance contract prepared by
an insurance company is to be construed against the insurer and in favor of
the insured. 2
Courts have applied at least four different theories to determine the
appropriate trigger of coverage. 3 The "exposure theory," which is often
applied in asbestos and other toxic tort cases, holds that the insurance policy is
triggered by a third party's exposure to the chemical during the policy period.84
If there are multiple exposures to the contamination, multiple policies may be
triggered. However, this theory is rarely applied to environmental cases
involving property damage because, in such cases, "exposure" has little
meaning beyond actual injury or contamination.
The "injury-in-fact theory," which is more often applied in environmental
pollution cases, posits that the duty to indemnify arises when there has been
actual injury to the property of a third party during the policy period8 5 The
"exposure theory" and the "injury-in-fact theory" are functionally equivalent
when considered in the context of a claim for property damage from
environmental contamination because the injury occurs simultaneous with the
exposure, i.e., once third party property is exposed to the contamination,
property damage has occurred.
The "manifestation theory" considers the duty to indemnify triggered
on the date the damage manifests itself.86 This theory applies the latest of
80. Freeman, supra note 77; Weihofen, supra note 78.
81. Clauses introduced by "which" are nonrestrictive and provide only incidental
nonessential information about a previous word. Thus, even if the clause is omitted, the
meaning of the sentence will remain intact. See FREEMAN, supra note 77, at 33.
82. See Pridgen, 498 So. 2d at 1248.
83. Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, 478 (E.D. Mich.
1989); Celotex Corp. v. AIU Ins. Co., 152 B.R. 647, 650 n.3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); but see
Huntzinger v. Hastings Mut. Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 302, 314-15 (7th Cir. 1998) (identifying seven
distinct trigger theories).
84. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977,
982 (8th Cir. 1988); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir.
1985).
85. See, e.g., Bell Lumber & Pole Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 437, 443
(8th Cir. 1995); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 896 F.2d 865, 876 (5th Cir. 1990).
86. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986);
Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1982). Some courts have
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the four trigger dates and is generally considered the most proinsurer of the
four theories. In practice, the "manifestation theory" often converts an
"occurrence-based" policy into a "claims-made" policy because policies that
expired before discovery of the contamination would not be triggered.
8 7
Because, the insured has a duty to provide prompt notice of the occurrence,
coverage will generally only exist under the policy in effect at the time of
such notice.
The fourth trigger theory, the "continuous trigger theory," is essentially
an amalgamation of the aforementioned theories because coverage is
triggered: 1) at the time of the initial exposure; 2) at the time of any actual
injury or property damage; and 3) at the time of manifestation." s The
continuous trigger theory is generally considered the most proinsured of the
theories because it provides coverage for the entire period from the initial
exposure or release through the discovery of the contamination. 89 However,
whether this is actually the case depends in large part on the court's
approach to the scope of coverage by each insurer on the risk when multiple
policies are triggered. If the court applies the Keene "joint and several
liability" approach, discussion Section IV.D. below, then all insurers whose
policies have been triggered would be held jointly and severally liable, up to
their respective policy limits, for "all sums" that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay.90 However, if the court applies a "pro-rata" approach to
allocation, discussed in Section IV.E.2. below, having more triggered
policies can work to the insured's detriment.91
For example, consider a scenario in which the insured becomes liable
for one million dollars in cleanup costs and has ten triggered policies that
each contain a self-insured retention or deductible of $100,000. In such a
scenario, a court applying a continuous trigger and a pro-rata allocation
theory would allocate $100,000 to each policy, which would be promptly
swallowed by the self-insured retention in each such policy. Accordingly,
elucidated three different formulations of the manifestation theory, depending on whether
coverage is triggered when the damage is actually discovered, when it should have been
discovered, or when the insured "knew or should have known" of the property damage.
Huntzinger, 143 F.3d at 314-15; Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328. See CPC Int'l v. Northbrook Excess &
Surplus Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 1211, 1219-20 (1st Cir. 1995).
87. See Huntzinger, 143 F.3d at 315.
88. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Arm, 667 F.2d 1034, 1044-46 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see generally Hunizinger, 143 F.3d at 315; Celotex Corp., 152 B.R. at 651.
89. Celotex Corp., 152 B.IR at 651.




Goldenberg: The Scope of Insurance Coverage for Pollution Claims in Florida:
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
the insured would have to pay for the entire one million in cleanup costs,
92with no assistance from any of its triggered insurance policies.
While no Florida court has decided the issue in a published decision,
the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that the injury-in-fact theory is the
approach most likely to be adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida.93
However, based on the supreme court's recent opinion in CTC, it is not clear
how the injury-in-fact trigger would differ from a continuous trigger under
Florida law. Some courts distinguish the injury-in-fact trigger from the
continuous trigger on the rationale that the injury-in-fact trigger does not
provide coverage for continuous injury or property damage that began before
the policy period.94 However, when the release involves active, continuous
leaching, as opposed to the passive persistence of the contamination, the
policy language does not support a trigger theory that provides coverage only
upon the initial discharge of the pollution, because no term in the policy
imposes a "discrete temporal limitation on 'injury"' or "property damage."'9
Because continuous contamination that was both unexpected or unintended
would cause injury-in-fact in each subsequent policy period, both the injury-
in-fact and continuous trigger theories should provide coverage from the date
of the initial discharge until the contamination is cleaned up.
92. The scenario discussed above is just one example of the dramatic impact that given
trigger and allocation theories can have on the extent of coverage an insured might receive.
Whether a court permits an insured to recover on excess policies before exhausting all primary
policies ("horizontal exhaustion"), or whether the insured must recover on all primary and excess
policies for a given year before recovering on other years' policies ("vertical exhaustion"), also
plays an important role in the coverage equation. Similarly, whether a court permits "stacking" of
policies at the same coverage level can be critical to the insured's recovery. A complete
discussion of these issues, and the effect of deductibles and self-insured retentions on an insured's
entitlement to insurance proceeds is beyond the scope of this article. For a thorough discussion
of this subject, see Garrett G. Gillespie, The Allocation of Coverage Responsibility Among
Multiple Triggered Commercial General Liability Policies in Environmental Cases: Life After
Owens-Illinois, 15 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 525 (1996). See also Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 978 F. Supp. 589 (D.N.J. 1997), rev'd, 177 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1999);
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116 (N.J. 1998).
93. See Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Biltmore Constr. Co., 767 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir.
1985); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 93-132-CIV-J-10 (M.D. Fla. July 20,
1995); Mealey's Litigation Report-Insurance (Dec. 3, 1996) (applying injury-in-fact trigger to
claims under the laws of Florida, Michigan, South Carolina, Indiana, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania); but see Celotex Corp. v. AIU Ins. Co., 152 B.R. 647, 651 n.4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1993) (stating "Trizec does not speak with sufficient certainty that this Court is willing to hold
that injury-in-fact is the trigger in Florida").
94. See Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 997 F.2d
172, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1993).
95. New Castle County v. Continental Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 810 (D. Del. 1989),
rev'd, 970 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1992), affid in part, rev'd in part, 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991).
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C. The Concurrent Cause Doctrine
The question presented in each of the scenarios listed at the beginning
of this article is, to what extent must the insurer indemnify the insured for
damages resulting from a pollution release when some portion of the
contamination was caused by noncovered releases? While Florida law has
not yet dealt with this issue in the pollution context, case law that has
developed in the context of non-environmental claims provides a likely
answer to this question.96
The doctrine of concurrent causes applies when an "indivisible" loss is
caused simultaneously by two separate events.97 When only one of the
events is covered by an insurance policy, Florida courts hold that the insurer
becomes jointly and severally liable for the entire loss.98 In Wallach v.
Rosenberg,99 a sea wall between the Wallachs' home and their neighbor's
collapsed during a storm, precipitating a domino-like crumbling of a portion
of the [neighbor's] sea wall.' The neighbor then sued Wallach and his
insurance carrier.10' The issue was whether the sea wall collapse was caused
by Wallach's negligent maintenance of the wall, an event covered under the
insurance policy, or the water pressure caused by the storm, an excluded
loss. 1 2 On appeal, the court held that "the jury may find coverage where an
insured risk constitutes a concurrent cause of the loss even where 'the
insured risk [is] not.., the prime or efficient cause of the accident."' 10 3 This
policy is consistent with the Florida rule that the duty to defend applies to
both covered and uncovered claims,1°4 as well as the rule preventing an
insurer who pays a judgment on behalf of a Joint tortfeasor from maintaining
a contribution action against other insurers.
96. See Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
97. See id. at 1387.
98. See id; accord Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Snell, 627 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
99. 527 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
100. Id. at 1386.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1387.
103. Id (quoting 11 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INsURmCE 2D § 44:268 (rev. ed.
1982)). See also West American Ins. Co. v. Chateau La Mer II Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 622
So. 2d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
104. See Grissom v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 1299, 1307 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
105. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 So. 2d 162,
163 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1970). "Since tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, and an
injured party after obtaining judgment against multiple defendants may select the one he desires
1999]
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The concurrent cause doctrine applies "only when the multiple causes
are not related and dependent, and involve a separate and distinct risk."'" In
a pollution case involving separate releases, some of which are covered
"sudden and accidental" releases and others that are not, this rule is
consistent with the rule applied in Massachusetts in Nashua, Aerovox, and
Millipore. Thus, under Florida insurance law, if two independent events
cause property damage, one of which is covered under an insurance policy
and the other is not, coverage exists.10 As explained in Wallach and West
American, this doctrine is based on common sense: 1 8 if the insured bought
insurance coverage for property damage caused by a sudden discharge of
pollutant or contaminants, it is entitled to get that coverage.1o9
While separate and independent pollution events rarely occur "con-
currently" in the true sense of the word, different releases do often cause
indivisible damage. In this regard, the concurrent cause doctrine simply
reflects the traditional tort method for dealing with indivisible harm-joint
and several liability.110 The modem trend in CERCLA cases to apportion
liability when a site's contamination is divisible reflects the reverse
application of the same tort principle.' When the harm is not divisible,
both the common law and CERCLA impose joint and several liability. In
practice, the same is true under Florida law because comparative fault under
section 768.81, of the Florida Statutes, does not apply to actions for the
recovery of actual economic damages resulting from pollution. 12 Accord-ingly, under the rationale of the concurrent cause cases, the insurer should be
to subject to execution, the carrier must bear the same inequitable burden as is borne by its
insured." Id.
106. Transamerica Ins. Co., 627 So. 2d at 1276.
107. West American Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d at 1108; Wallach, 527 So. 2d at 1387-88.
108. West American Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d at 1105; Wallach, 527 So. 2d at 1388.
109. West American Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d at 1105; Wallach, 527 So. 2d at 1388.
110. See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1987), superceded
by statute by Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993) (providing "[t]he feasibility of
apportioning fault on a comparative basis does not render an indivisible injury 'divisible' for
purposes of the joint and several liability rule. A concurrent tortfeasor is liable for the whole of
an indivisible injury when his negligence is a proximate cause of that damage."); Hernandez v.
Pensacola Coach Corp., 193 So. 555, 558 (Fla. 1940) (stating "[it] is a general principle of
negligence, where an injury results from two separate and distinct acts of negligence committed
by different persons operating concurrently, that both are regarded as the proximate cause and
that recovery can be had against either or both"); see also W. PAGE KEETON, Er AL., PROSSER AND
KEarON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 41 at 266-67 (5th ed. 1984).
Ill. See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs. Co., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2nd Cir. 1993); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-
79 (1st Cir. 1989).
112. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(4)(b) (1999).
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liable for the full extent of the damages paid by the insured, absent policy
provisions further limiting the insurer's liability.
D. Allocation Cases-Asbestos
The issue of allocating insurance policy liability for occurrences that
span several policy periods has been addressed in a line of cases dealing
with asbestos liability. As in the environmental context, asbestos occur-
rences sometimes span decades and call into question dozens of policies.
However, insurers argue that each policy typically limits coverage to losses
occurring within the policy period. Courts are split as to which of two
general theories should be applied to these allocation decisions.
1 3
The joint and several liability theory was most prominently pronounced
in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America.14 In Keene, the court
noted that "when Keene is held liable for an asbestos related disease, only
part of the disease will have developed during any single policy period."'
Based upon the phrase "all sums" in the policy, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the insurer is liable in full for all
damages notwithstanding the fact that some of the disease developed during
other policy periods.' 16 The Keene court stated:
As we interpret the policies, they cover Keene's entire liability
once they are triggered. That interpretation is based on the terms
of the policies themselves. We have no authority upon which to
pretend that Keene also has a "self-insurance" policy that is trigger-
ed for periods in which no other policy was purchased. Even if we
had the authority, what would we pretend that the policy provides?
What would its limits be? There are no self-insurance policies, and
we respectfully submit that the contracts before us do not sup-port
judicial creation of such additional insurance policies." 7
The court noted that the policies did not "distinguish between injury that is
caused by occurrences that continue to transpire over a long period of time
and more common types of injury."' 18 Accordingly, the insured may collect
the full amount of indemnity that is due from any insurer whose coverage is
triggered, subject only to the provisions in the policies that govern the
113. Id.; see also O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989).
114. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 1047.
116. Id
117. Id at 1048-49.
118. Id. at 1049.
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allocation of liability when more than one policy covers an injury. Other
courts dealing with asbestos trigger issues have followed the approach
enunciated in Keene.119 For example, in ACandS Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,12 the Third Circuit followed the Keene approach for asbestosclaims. The court stated:
The policies require the insurers to pay all sums which ACandS
becomes "legally obligated to pay" because of bodily injury during
the policy period. It is uncontested that under principles of tort law
ACandS may be held fully liable for a personal injury plaintiffs
damages caused in part by ACandS' asbestos during a particular
period, even though plaintiffs damages may also have been
caused, in part, at other times. It follows that if a plaintiffs
damages are caused in part during an insured period, it is irrelevant
to ACandS' legal obligations and, therefore, to the insurer's
liability that they were also caused, in part, during another
period."'
In contrast to the Keene joint and several liability approach stands "the
pro-rata time on the risk" theory ("pro-rata theory") of insurer liability. The
pro-rata theory was most prominently applied in Insurance Co. of North• • •122
America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., and Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
United Insurance Co.12 In Forty-Eight Insulations, the Sixth Circuit,
applying Illinois law, held that defense costs should be prorated over the
course of the occurrence.12 Like the court in Keene, the Forty-Eight
Insulations court looked to the terms of the contract to define the scope of
coverage.12 However, in Forty-Eight Insulations, the court concluded that
the insurer had not contracted to qy defense costs for occurrences that take
place outside the policy period. Accordingly, the different insurance
companies that run the risk over the course of the occurrence were required
119. See J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993); Lac
D'Amiante du Quebec v. American Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549 (D.N.J. 1985);
ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1985).
120. 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1985).
121. Id. at 974 (internal citation omitted).
122. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
123. 650 A.2d 974 (N.L 1994).
124. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1226.
125. Id. at 1215-16.
126. Id. The proration approach applied in Fony-Eight Insulations is inconsistent with
the Florida rule that once the duty to defend is triggered, the insured must provide a defense to
the entire action. See, e.g., Grissom v. Commercial Union Ins. Co, 610 So. 2d 1299, 1307 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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to prorate defense costs among themselves. The court treated the insured as
an insurer for those periods of time that it had no insurance coverage. 127
Although often cited as authority for the pro-rata approach, Forty-Eight
Insulations has limited precedential value because the Supreme Court of
Illinois rejected this approach in favor ofjoint and several liability in Zurich
Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industry, Inc.
In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co.,129 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey applied an allocation method that was related to both the time of
the risk and the degree of risk assumed. 30 The court allocated a portion of
damages to the insured for uncovered years but only when no insurance was
available.13 1 Unlike the Keene and Forty-Eight Insulations courts, the court
in Owens-Illinois was unable to find the answer to allocation in the policy
language. 1 2 Instead, the court looked to policy considerations and conclud-
ed that the Keene joint and several liability rule reduces the property owner's
incentive to insure against future risks.135 As such, the court was unwilling
to allocate costs to the insured for periods in which coverage was not
available.
134
E. Allocation in the Environmental Context
While many of the cases dealing with these scope of coverage issues
have arisen in the context of asbestos claims, several courts have considered
these issues in the context of environmental pollution claims. Results in
these cases have been mixed, with some courts applying a proration formula
as in Forty-Eight Insulations and Owens-Illinois, while other courts have
imposed joint and several liability.13 5
Whether the asbestos cases are truly analogous to hazardous waste
cases is questionable. While all asbestos bodily injury cases have essentially
the same etiology-ingestion of an asbestos fiber, exposure in residence, and
manifestation-environmental pollution cases can differ dramatically. In
dealing with groundwater contamination issues, factual considerations such
as whether rain flushed the same quantity of contaminants into the ground
each year or whether the plume of contaminants advanced in an equal rate
127. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1224-25.
128. 514 N.E.2d 150 (111. 1987).
129. 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994).
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over successive policies can have a significant impact on whether it is
appropriate to apply pro-rata allocation principles.
36
1. Early Cases-Joint and Several Liability
The first cases dealing with the allocation issue in the environmental
context followed the joint and several liability approach enunciated in Keene
and ACandS. In New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co.,137 the court
faced the allocation issue in the context of landfill leachate that caused
groundwater contamination. 138 Citing ACandS, the court held that "there is
no proration of losses under a policy once coverage is triggered." 139 The
court continued by stating "[t]he terms of the contract are not affected by
prior or subsequent coverage. ' 140 Further, the court noted that although the
insurer makes reference to other policies that may be implicated, it cites no
evidence of the terms of those policies. 141 Thus, there was not enough
evidence with which to prorate damages even if the law authorized
proration. 42
That same year, in Federal Insurance Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting
Co.,143 the court addressed the allocation issue with regard to CERCLA
liability under some policies that had pollution exclusion clauses and others
that did not.144 The case involved waste generated by Susquehanna
Broadcasting Company ("SBC") from 1975 through 1983 that contaminated
soil and well water in adjoining residential areas.' 45 The policies in effect
before 1976 or 1977 did not contain a pollution exclusion clause, but
subsequent policies did.' 46 The court concluded that coverage under the
earlier policies was triggered and that damages could not be apportioned.
47
Accordingly, the court followed the joint and several approach applied in
136. Id.
137. 725 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1989), affrd in part, rev'd in part, 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.
1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1992).
138. Id. at 806.
139. Id. at 817 (quoting ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 968 (3d
Cir. 1985)).
140. Id. (citing Sandoz, Inc. v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257, 266
(D.N.J. 1983)).
141. Id.
142. New Castle County v. Continental Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 817 (D. Del. 1989).
143. 727 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1989), amended on reconsideration in part, 238 F.
Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
144. Id. at 169.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 175.
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Keene and ACandS, and held the insurers liable for the full extent of the
cleanup costs.148 In so holding, the court noted that "generators of environ-
mental waste can be held jointly liable for all response costs even though
others may have contributed to the pollution."'149 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the earlier policies covered all of SBC's response cost liability,




Similarly, in Detrex Chemical Industries v. Employers Insurance,151 the
court found that for each policy that is triggered, the policy must cover all
damages directly and proximately resulting from the occurrence that caused
the injury-in-fact during that policy period.15 2 Thus, the court held that
without a more complete factual record of the occurrences, the question of
allocation was not appropriate for summary judgment because it necessarily
153
requires a determination as to which policies have been triggered. The
court recognized that damages can only be allocated to policies that have
been triggered.' 54 Thus, if the contamination was caused by a single event,
or if there is only one policy that has been triggered, that policy assumes
liability for all damages directly and proximately resulting from the
155occurrence.
In Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.,156 the court held that
although an insured must prove that actual injury occurred during the policy
period, coverage is not limited to the injury that occurred during the policy
period if the injury is part of a continuous, indivisible process. In Hatco,
Grace operated an industrial chemical manufacturing facility in Fords, New
Jersey between 1959 and 1978. 58 Effluent containing various organic
chemical compound was pumped directly into ditches and streams that
drained into the Passaic River.159 In the mid 1960s, Grace constructed
unlined ponds that were su Uosed to hold the effluent so that the useful
product could be recovered. The ponds were also used to dump other
chemicals that had been used in the manufacturing process, including heat
148. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. at 175.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 746 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ohio 1990).




156. 801 F. Supp. 1334 (D.NJ. 1992).
157. Id. at 1345.





Goldenberg: The Scope of Insurance Coverage for Pollution Claims in Florida:
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
transfer fluids containing Polychloronated Bipheynls ("PCB") that were
dumped by employees from fifty-five-gallon drums directly into the
ponds. 161 Grace eventually sold the facility to the Hatco Corporation. 162 In
1989, Hatco filed an action against Grace to recover all sums expended to
remove hazardous substances disposed of on site. 163 In turn, Grace sued its
primary and excess insurers for indemnification because it claimed that all
the damages alleged fail within the definition of "occurrence" in the
policies.
Applying a continuous trigger theory, the court looked to the language
of the insurance contract to determine the scope of coverage. 165 The court
noted that the policy language did not expressly restrict coverage to the
injury that resulted during the policy period, even though such a provision
could have been expressly included in the policies. 66 The court found that
"because the Insurers agreed to pay all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages," they essentially stepped "into the shoes
of the insured."1 67 Under CERCLA, Grace became jointly and severally
liable for the full extent of damage sustained by Hatco if the harm sustained
was indivisible. 168 Thus, the court would apportion liability only to the
extent that the insurers can rebut a showing that the injury was indivisible. 69
In Ray Industry, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,170 the Sixth
Circuit addressed the allocation issue with regard to CERCLA liability
arising from Sea Ray Boats, Inc.'s disposal of wastes from 1966 to 1979.
The district court had held that because the pollution exclusion clause
appeared in policies issued on or after July 1, 1971, the policies only covered
contamination caused before that date. 17 The Sixth Circuit agreed that the
insurer's duty to defend did not extend to matters that would have no
relation to the 1966 to 1970 policies, but the court recognized that,
considering the nature of CERCLA liability, it was not clear that such
matters existed. 173 The court recognized that the insured was subject to full
liability for events that occurred during each policy period, and held that the




165. Id. at 1345.
166. Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 1345.
167. Id. at 1346 (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Id
170. 974 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1992).
171. Id. at 754.
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insured had coverage up to the full policy limits for each year from 1966 to
1970.174 The court specifically refused to further apportion damages via
proration to the insured. 75
In Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Casulty & Surety Co., 76
Chemical Leaman operated a tank truck operation specializing in the
transport of various chemicals and other liquids. 177 From 1960 to 1969,
Chemical Leaman placed contaminated rinse water into a wastewater
treatment system consisting of unlined ponds and lagoons.17 8 This lasted
until 1975 when they installed a wastewater treatment system.179 "By 1977,
Chemical Leaman had drained the ponds and lagoons of liquid, dredged the
accumulated sludge out of the lagoons, and filled all the ponds and lagoons
with brickbat, sand, and concrete.'"' In 1984 the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") placed the site on the National Priorities List ("NPL")
under CERCLA and alleged that Chemical Leaman was strictly liable for the
damages and cleanup costs resulting from the contamination. 18 Conse-
quently, Chemical Leaman notified its insurer and requested indemnifi-
cation.1
82
In Chemical Leaman, the court found that New Jersey law applies the
continuous trigger theory. 8 3 Basing its decision on the Hatco case, the court
held that the insurer was jointly and severally liable up to the policy limits
for all damages resulting from the occurrence, including damage that
occurred before and after the policy period.184 As in Hatco, because
Chemical Leaman was subject to strict liability under CERCLA, the court
held that all policies triggered by a continuous occurrence must bear joint
and several liability.18 5 The court noted that under New Jersey law, the
insured must make two factual showings before imposing joint and several
liability under the continuous trigger theory. 86 First, the insured must showthat some kind of property damage occurred during each policy period at
174. Id. at 770.
175. Ray Indus., Inc., 974 F.2d at 770.
176. 817 F. Supp. 1136 (D.NJ. 1993), rev'd, 117 F.3d 210 (1999).




181. Chemical Leaman, 817 F. Supp. at 1140.
182. Id.
183. 1d. at 1153.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Diamond Shamrock Chem. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 466 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
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issue.187 Second, the insured must show that the property damage was part
of a continuous and indivisible process of injury. 18r If the insured could
make these showings, then it could recover up to the policy limits of each
policy in effect from 1960 until the manifestation of the soil and
groundwater damage.
1 89
The continued validity of the Hatco and Chemical Leaman decisions is
questionable in light of the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in
Owens-Illinois. 190 On appeal in Chemical Leaman, the Third Circuit held
that because the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected joint and several
liability in favor of a risk-based allocation of liability among applicable
insurance policies in Owens-Illinois, the case should be remanded to the
district court for a reallocation of liability between the insurer and the
insured. 191  Because the district courts in Chemical Leaman guessed
incorrectly as to the Supreme Court of New Jersey's interpretation of these
insurance policies, the district court's opinion has no direct precedential
value.
2. Recent Cases-Pro-Rata Allocation
The Owens-Illinois case has proven quite influential even outside of
New Jersey. Recent cases have departed from the joint and several liability
approach in favor of apportionment in certain circumstances. In Northern
States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 192 the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that contamination of groundwater should be
analyzed as a continuous process in which the property damage is evenly
proportioned throughout the period of time from the first contamination to
the end of the last triggered policy. 193 From 1973 until 1978, power plants
were operated on the insured's facility.' 94 The insured, Northern States
Power ("NSP"), had an insurance program that included standard compre-
hensive general liability policies with self-insured retentions of $25,000 per
occurrence from 1958 to 1970 and $100,000 per occurrence from 1970 to
1973.195 These policies were labeled as excess liability policies, and the
record indicated that no other insurer issued any primary liability policies
187. ChemicalLeaman, 817 F. Supp. at 1153.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1154.
190. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1984).
191. Id.
192. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
193. Id. at 664.
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between 1958 and 1973.196 In 1981, the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency discovered that the groundwater at the site was contaminated with
coal tars and spent oxide waste and ordered NSP to clean up the
contaminated property.197 NSP settled with some of its carriers, but did not
settle with others. Applying an injury-in-fact trigger theory, the court held
that the insured bears the burden of Xoving that the policy was triggered and
therefore that coverage is available. The court held that the environmental
damage occurred over successive policy periods and concluded that the
damages should be presumed to have been continuous from the point of the
first damage to the point of discovery or cleanup.2 W Accordingly, the court
applied a pro-rata by time on the risk allocation theory similar to that used in
Owens-Illinois.20 1 Thus, NSP was required to pay one deductible per policy
period while being liable for its pro-rata share of any uninsured or self-
insured periods.
More recently, the NSP approach was aplied by a Minnesota court in
Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co. In Domtar, the insured coal-
tar processor sued several of its liability insurers for the costs incurred in
cleaning up coal-tar contamination that occurred between 1933 and 1991.2N
In the absence of any identifiable release during a specific policy period, the
court presumed that the damage was continuous and allocated liability
among the insurers on a pro-rata "time-on-the-risk" basis?' 5  The court
upheld the trial court's allocation of liability to the insured for uninsured
periods and cited Forty-Eight Insulations.2
6
Similarly, in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co.,2 7 the
court determined that all insurers on the risk should contribute in proportion
to their respective policies' liability limits or the time periods covered under
each such policy. "From 1947 to 1982, Montrose manufactured the
pesticide, dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane ("DDT"), at its plant in
196. Id.
197. Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 659.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 662.
200. ML at 664.
201. See id.
202. Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 664.
203. 552 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. CL App. 1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 563 N.W.2d
724 (Minn. 1997).
204. Id. at 743.
205. HL at 743-44.
206. Id. at 744 (citing Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633
F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980)).
207. 913 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1995).
208. Id. at 878.
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Torrance, California. 2W Admiral Insurance Company had issued four CGL
210policies to Montrose covering the period from 1982 to 1986. The court
held that, where successive CGL policy periods are implicated, damages that
are continuous over several policy periods are potentially covered by all
policies in effect during those periods. The court suggested that courts
whose analyses failed to draw these distinctions are actually clouding the
issue for the allocation of triggered policies.212
In Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,213 an
appellate court in Illinois applied an allocation formula similar to that
employed in Forty-Eight and Owens-Illinois.214  There, the insured,
Outboard Marine Corp., was a large manufacturer of outboard motors that
operated a dye casting facility in Waukegan, Illinois. 2 15 In its dye casting
process, Outboard Marine Corp. used a hydraulic fluid, pydraul, that
216contained Polychlorinated Biphenyl's from 1953 through 1970.
Polychlorinated Biphenyl's laden effluent was routed to a ditch on Outboard
Marine Corp. property and eventually found its way into Waukegan Harbor
and Lake Michigan. Residual amounts of PCB laden Pydraul remained in
Outboard Marine Corp.'s dye casting machines until approximately 1976.218
In March of 1978, the federal government sued OMC to compel it to
remediate the contaminated areas, and in 1986, Outboard Marine Corp. sued
its primary insurance companies alleging a duty to defend and indemnify
them in connection with the federal environmental litigation.219
In applying the pro-rata theory, the court noted that while the insurers
agreed to indemnify Outboard Marine Corp. for "all sums," it had to be for
sums incurred as a result of property damage during the policy period.20 In
finding that allocation was appropriate, the court stated that:
[t]he contamination of the groundwater should be regarded as a
continuous process in which the property damage is evenly
distributed over the period of time from the first contamination to
the end of the last triggered policy (or self-insured) period, and we
209. Id. at 881.
210. Id.
211. Il at904.
212. Montrose Chem. Corp., 913 P.2d at 904.
213. 670 N.E.2d 740 (111. App. 2d 1996).
214. Id. at 746.
215. Id. at 744.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Outboard Marine, 670 N.E.2d at 745.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 748.
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have also held that the total amount of property damage should be
allocated to the various policies in proportion to the period of time
each was on the risk.2' 1
Following the language in Forty-Eight Insulations, the court treated the
insured as an insurance company for the years in which it had no insurance
coverage, and allocated a portion of liability to the insured.tM  Further, the
court summarily dismissed Outboard Marine Corp.'s joint and several
liability argument:
OMC cites no authority for its novel proposition that, because its
liability under CERCLA is joint and several, the liability of the
excess insurers cannot be apportioned on a pro-rata basis. OMC
ignores the principal that insurance coverage disputes are governed
by contract law. We can find no rationale to support the imposition
of joint and several liability upon the insurers simply because
OMC's liability arose under CERCLA.m
Recently, in Missouri Pacific Railroad. v. International Insurance
Co.,2 4 the court followed its previous holding in Outboard Marine Corp.
and applied the pro-rata theoryYms There, the insured railroad company
sought indemnification from insurers for noise-induced hearing loss and
asbestos exposure claims based on exposures over a seventy-three-year
span.2 6 The insured alleged that the claims each arose from "one proximate,
uninterrupted, and continuing cause" during each of approximately thirty
insurance policies.2 7 The trial court certified two questions to the court of
appeals regarding whether the "all sums" rule of Zurich Insurance Co. = or
the pro-rata, "time-on-the-risk" approach of Outboard Marine Corp. governs
allocation of coverage.229 The court looked to the policy definition of
"occurrence," which by definition must occur during the policy period, to
hold that the insurer is only liable for damages that occurred during the
policy period.230 Accordingly, the court followed Outboard Marine Corp.
221. Id. at 749 (quoting Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523
N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn. 1994)).
222. Id.
223. Outboard Marine, 670 N.E.2d at 750.
224. 679 N.E.2d 801 (IM. App. 2d Dist. 1997).




229. Missouri Pac. R.R., 679 N.E.2d at 803.
230. Id. at 804.
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and applied the pro-rata, time-on-the-risk approach because the damage
cannot be measured and allocated to particular policy periods2 31
3. Limits on the Pro-rata Approach-Single Event Causing Indivisible
As the above-discussed cases indicate, the recent trend is toward pro-
rata allocation among insurers that were on the risk during the period of
continuous damage. However, the pro-rata allocation cases discussed above
involved continuous injury in which there was no single event that was the
primary cause of the groundwater contamination. Importantly, although
Forty-Eight Insulations is one of the principal allocation cases, the court
noted that where there is no reasonable means of prorating the cost of
defense between the covered and noncovered items, the insurer must bear the
entire cost of defense.232 In the typical situation, the court noted, suit will be
brought as the result of a single accident, but only some of the damages
sought will be covered under the insurance policy. 3 In these cases, the
court recognized that prorating costs between the insured claim and the
uninsured claim is very difficult, and as a result, courts should impose the
full cost of the defense on the insurer.2
34
Similarly, in Owens-Illinois, the court recognized the difference
between cases involving the gradual release of contaminants and cases in
which the occurrence and the attendant inijuries are easily identified as
falling within a particular policy period.235 Using an explosion as an
example, the court noted that "[e]ven though 'all sums' due from the
accident might not be known with certainty at the time of the explosion, by
the time of trial a claimant would be able to establish, within a reasonable
degree of medical probability, what damages would flow from the injury."'236
In SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,237 the Supreme Court of
Minnesota declined to apply the Northern States pro-rata by time on the risk
approach that it had adopted only one year earlier.238 From 1976 to the end
of 1988, SCSC operated a dry cleaning and laundry supply distribution
facility in St. Louis Park, Minnesota, where it stored perchloroethylene in
two above-ground storage tanks.239 In 1988, perchloroethylene was detected
231. Id. at 807.
232. Fony-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1224.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 989.
236. Id.
237. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995).
238. ld. at318.
239. Id. at 308.
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in the groundwater downgradient of the SCSC facility. 24  At trial, the jury
found that the contamination was caused by a single event in 1977.241 The
trial court gave the jury the opportunity to divide the damages among the
various insurance policies in effect from 1976 through 1988, but the jury
found that the damages were not divisible.242 There was no evidence in the
record to indicate that any post-1977 additions of perchloroethylene to the
groundwater increased clean up costs.243 In refusing to apportion liability
over the policy periods, the court noted that its decision in Northern States
was an equitable decision based upon the complexity of proving in which
policy periods covered property damage arose.244  Because in SCSC the
damage was not divisible and arose from a single sudden and accidental
occurrence, the court held that only the 1977 policy applied.245 Accordingly,
damages in excess of the $1,100,000 aggregate limit were not covered,
consistent with the actual injury theory.246
The only court known to have considered the allocation issue under
Florida law held that the Keene "joint and several liability" theory would be
adopted in Florida.2 47 Thus, when covered events combine with noncovered
events, such as events outside the policy period, causing damage that is not
divisible, the insurer is liable for the full extent of damages. This approach
is consistent with Florida's concurrent cause doctrine.
Based upon the "all sums" language in the standard CGL policy and the
doctrine of concurrent causes, if the contamination at the insured's facility
was caused by multiple events, one of which is a covered loss, then coverage
exists. The insurer cannot avoid its contractual duty to pay "all damages
which the insured is legally obligated to pay" because of the fortuitous
occurrence of a concurrent cause outside of the scope of its policy.248
240. Id. at 309.
241. Id. at 317.





247. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 93-132 CIV-J-10, Slip. Op. at 9-10
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 1996) at 13-15; see also Carey Canada, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., Co., No.
Civ. A. No. 84-3113 JHP, 1988 WL 169287, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1988) (noting that "[Florida]
law does not appear to deviate in any significant respect from general insurance principles
recognized in Keene. . . ").
248. See Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 700. Interestingly, the concurrent cause
argument was briefed before the Supreme Court of Florida in Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc., but the
court did not reach the issue because it held that there were no covered "sudden and accidental"
releases to trigger coverage. Id.
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V. AN INSURER'S LIABILITY IS NOT LIMITED TO DAMAGES CAUSED
DURING THE POLICY PERIOD
The cases rejecting the joint and several liability approach on the
grounds that the insurer is liable only for damage that occurs during the
policy period are missing the point. While the standard CGL policy provides
coverage only when there is an occurrence during the policy period, such
policies contain no language limiting coverage to damages that occur during
the policy period. As the Hatco court recognized, such a provision could
easily have been included in the policies, but it was not.
249
It is true that the definition of "property damage" indicates that there
must be some injury during the policy period. However, the standard CGL
policy requires the insurer to pay "all sums" the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of such property damage. When an
insured becomes jointly and severally liable for all clean up costs at a site
even though not all such costs were caused by its release, the insurer steps
into the shoes of the insured and may also be held jointly and severally
liable. Thus, while some personal injury or property damage must occur
during the policy period, a rule by which the insured would have to prove
precisely how much damage occurred during the policy period would place
the insured in an impossible situation.2
VI. CONCLUSION
The limited authority available on the issue indicates that Florida courts
would likely adopt the injury-in-fact trigger theory, which is fundamentally
equivalent to the continuing trigger theory under Florida law. Based on the
policies enunciated in Wallach v. Rosenberg 5 1 it appears equally likely that
a Florida court would apply the joint and several approach to the allocation
issue as long as the insured can show that some covered property damage
occurred during the policy period. Since most courts consider environmental
contamination to be "property damage" as soon as it occurs, it generally
should not be difficult to establish that the policy was triggered.
Accordingly, Florida's insured's may be able to obtain full indemnification
249. Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 1347.
250. See New Castle County v. Continental Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 812 (D. Del.
1989) (insured not required to "prove the impossible" in order to establish coverage); see also
Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 663 (noting "[a]s a public policy matter, this court
cannot ignore the difficulty insureds would face if, as is generally the case, they had the burden of
proving the amount of damages for each policy at issue").
251. 527 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
404 [Vol. 24:373
32
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 10
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/10
Goldenberg
when covered occurrences combine with noncovered occurrences to cause
indivisible pollution damage.
Nevertheless, courts in other jurisdictions have become increasingly
willing to prorate defense and indemnity costs when it appears that
environmental damage was continuous or when the date of the occurrence is
uncertain. None of the cases discussed above dealt with the situation in
which the insured had coverage from different carriers throughout the course
of the contamination but elected to proceed against only one of the
insurers.z 2 However, adopting the joint and several liability approach would
suggest that the insured bears the burden of showing that other insurance
policies are implicated if the insurer can show that the damage was divisible
and that only a small portion was attributable to the covered release. In such
a case, the court may hold the insurer liable for a fraction of the clean up
costs while the insured would have to bear the remaining burden.
Nonetheless, this scenario seems unlikely in most cases.
First, it will typically be difficult for the insurer to show divisible
damages in most cases. Second, the rationale for prorating costs to the
insured-that the insured elected to go uncovered and become a self-
insurer-is not present in the case where the insured obtained insurance
during all relevant time periods, but could only sustain a claim against a
single insurer because of more restrictive pollution exclusions in later
policies. Considering the "all sums" language in the standard CGL policy, it
is unlikely that a Florida court would prorate costs to the insured for
damages outside the policy period.
Despite its growing popularity, the pro-rata, "time-on-the-risk"
approach seems to be at odds with an "injury in fact" trigger theory. The
standard CGL policy only requires an occurrence, i.e., some unexpected,
unintended property damage taking place during the policy period, not that
all of the damages occur during the policy period. Thus, once an accident
has caused damage during the policy period, the insurer should be liable for
"all sums" attributable to that occurrence. Allocation among insurers should
be governed by the "other insurance" clauses in the triggered policies.
Finally, the "drafting history" of the standard form CGL policies of
1966 and 1973 indicates that the drafters knew that the occurrence-based
language would result in coverage under successive policies for long tail
claims, that the language would result in the "pyramiding" of successive
policy limits, and that the language contained no allocation method for
multiple policies, thus leaving the insurers to apportion claims among
252. An insured may elect not to proceed against an insurer that was on the risk during the
time the contamination was present for a number of reasons, including inability to locate policies,
difficulty in establishing an "occurrence' during risk policy period, and insurer insolvency. See
New Castle County, 933 F.2d at 1162; Wallach, 527 So. 2d at 1386; Northern States Power 523
N.W. 2d at 657.
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themselves. Nevertheless, the insurers assumed the obligation to
indemnify for "all sums" up to the policy limits, regardless of whether
periods of non-coverage were also "triggered." Under such circumstances,
the insurer should bear joint and several liability just as its insureds do under
most modem environmental statutes.
253. See John E. Heintz et al., Allocation of Indemnity Among Multiple Insurance
Policies, 9 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 5, 11-12 (1996).
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